Abstract: In this paper we consider repeated coalitional games with transferable utilities (TU) over networks. Namely, we consider a set of n players that have to distribute among themselves a vector of rewards (one for each player). In our network version there is no coordinator allocating the rewards, but the agents have to agree on a common time-averaged vector by updating the local estimates of the reward vector. The common time-averaged reward vector has to approach a suitable constraint set, called core of the game, that guarantees that no agents benefit from quitting the grand coalition. We propose a doubly (over time and space) averaging distributed algorithm. At every iteration, each agent first computes a weighted average of its own timeaveraged estimate and those of his neighbors and then generates a new reward vector in order to drive the time-averaged estimate towards a pre-assigned set. The main contribution of the paper is to prove that under certain assumptions, i) all agents' estimates reach consensus on the true time-averaged reward vector, and ii) the estimates (and thus the true time-averaged reward vector) approach the pre-assigned set. Conditions for this to happen are related to the connectivity over time of the communication topology and to the approachability principle.
INTRODUCTION
Coalitional games with transferable utilities (TU) were first introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) and play an important role in several areas of Economics, Sociology and Engineering. A coalitional TU game constitutes of a set of players, who can form coalitions, and a characteristic function that provides a value for each coalition. The value of a coalition can be thought of as a monetary payoff that can be distributed among the members of the coalition according to some appropriate fairness allocation rule.
On the other hand multi-agent (peer-to-peer) systems have gained a significant interest in the last decade. Thus, it rises naturally the interest in studying coalitional TU games in which the players are agents of a peer-topeer network. That is, there is no coordinator assigning rewards, but the agents have to negotiate and, thus, selforganize in order to make the grand coalition stable with respect to subcoalitions. Here we consider a coalitional game that is played repeatedly over time. At each time the players first redistribute their current average allocation and then generate new value/reward. While redistributing, we assume that a player can only observe the allocations of his neighbors, where the neighbors may change in time.
The two main streams of literature which are relevant for this paper are: i) approachability in coalitional TU games and ii) consensus algorithms in multi-agent systems.
The main objective in coalitional TU games is to design policies for resource distribution such that each player remains in the grand coalition, namely in the set of all players. A key role along this line is played by the core of the game. The core is the set of imputations under which no coalition has a value greater than the sum of its members' payoffs. Therefore, no coalition has incentive to leave the grand coalition and receive a larger payoff. Thus, a typical problem in coalitional TU games is to study whether the core is an "approachable" set, and which allocation processes can drive the "complaint vector" to that set. Approachability theory was developed by Blackwell in the early '56, Blackwell (1956) , and is captured in the well known Blackwell's Theorem. Approachability can be reframed within differential games and as such can be studied using differential calculus and stability theory Lehrer and Sorin (2007) ; Soulaimani et al. (2009) . In particular, in Lehrer and Sorin (2007) the authors show that, beyond being the approachability principle an extension (to a vector space) of the Von-Neumann min-max theorem, it also has elements in common with differential inclusion Aubin and Cellina (1991) . In addition to this, the work Soulaimani et al. (2009) establishes connections with viability theory Aubin (1991) , and set-valued analysis Aubin and Frankowska (1990) , (see, e.g., the comparison between an approachable set and a discriminating set) and set invariance theory Blanchini (1999) . The geometric (approachability) principle that lies behind the Blackwells Theorem is among the fundamentals in several areas of game theory such as, allocation processes in coalitional games Lehrer (2002) , regret minimization Lehrer (2003) ; Hart and MasColell (2003) , adaptive learning Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi (2006); Foster and Vohra (1999); Hart (2005) ; Hart and Mas-Colell (2001) , excludability and bounded recall Lehrer and Solan (2006) , and weak approachability Vieille (1992) , just to name a few.
A common set-up in the literature on coalitional TU games and approachability is to allocate in a centralized fashion. That is, a central planner redistributes rewards based on the coalitions' complaints, i.e., the cumulated difference between coalitions' values and allocated rewards to the member of the coalitions over time Lehrer (2002) (see, e.g., also Bauso et al. (2012a) ). In this paper we consider coalitional TU games in which there is no central coordinator, so that players have to negotiate among themselves how to allocate rewards. In particular, each player can communicate only with neighboring players according to a neighbor graph and generates, at each communication round, a vector of players' rewards (see also the distributed allocation processes in Nedić and Bauso (2011) ). The objective is that all the agents reach asymptotically a common (temporal) average reward that lies in the core of the game. The discrete-time dynamics analyzed in the paper follows the rules of a typical consensus dynamics (see, e.g., Tsitsiklis (1984) ; Nedić et al. (2010) and references therein) . In consensus problems the agents use local control policies to make the agents agree on a given consensus value. Policies are local as are based on local information, i.e., information received from neighbors. A main feature is that the consensus value is unknown to the agents as depending, in general, on all initial states. Consensus dynamics arise in the literature on agreement among multiple agents, where an underlying communication graph for the agents and balancing weights have been used with some variations Tsitsiklis (1984) ; to reach an agreement on common decision variable, as well as in ; Nedić et al. (2010) ; Ram et al. (2010 Ram et al. ( , 2009 ); Notarstefano and Bullo (2011); Bürger et al. (2012) (see also Bürger et al. (2011) ) for distributed multi-agent optimization.
The main contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we consider a novel network coalitional TU game scenario. In this scenario a game is played repeatedly over time by a set of n players. Each player generates a reward vector whose components represent the rewards for the players. Differently from the classical scenario, there is no coordinator deciding how the reward vectors have to be generated. Players have to negotiate among themselves the reward vectors by communicating only with neighboring agents and by performing only local computations. The objective is to generate the rewards so that the timeaveraged reward vector approaches the core of the game, namely a set ensuring that all the players have interest in forming a unique coalition. As a second set of contributions, we propose a distributed negotiation protocol to generate the local reward vectors in order to: (i) estimate the time-averaged common reward vector, (ii) let it converge to the core of the game. The novelty of the proposed algorithm is that it involves a doubly (over time and space) averaging operation. At every iteration, each agent first computes a weighted spatial-average of its own (time-averaged) estimate and those of his neighbors, and then generates a new reward vector which is time-averaged with the previous estimate in order to drive it towards a pre-assigned set. We prove that under certain assumptions, (i) all agents' estimates reach consensus on the true timeaveraged reward vector, and (ii) the estimates (and thus the true time-average reward vector) approach the preassigned set. Conditions for this to happen are related to the connectivity over time of the communication topology and to the approachability principle.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the network game scenario. In Section, 3, we discuss the distributed negotiation algorithm. Convergence results are illustrated in Section 4. Finally, in Section 5, we provide concluding remarks and future directions.
Notation. We view vectors as columns. For a vector x, we use [x] j to denote its jth coordinate component. We let x denote the transpose of a vector x, and x denote its Euclidean norm. An n × n matrix A is row-stochastic if the matrix has nonnegative entries a to denote its ijth entry. A matrix A is doubly stochastic if both A and its transpose A are row-stochastic. Given two sets U and S, we write U ⊂ S to denote that U is a proper subset of S. We use |S| for the cardinality of a given finite set S. We write P X [x] to denote the projection of a vector x on a set X, and we write dist(x, X) for the distance from x to X, i.e., P X [x] = arg min y∈X x−y and dist(x, X) = x − P X [x] , respectively. Given a function of time x(·) : N → R, we denote byx(t) its average up to time t, i.e.,x(t) := 1 t t τ =1 x(τ ).
NETWORK COALITIONAL GAMES WITH TRANSFERABLE UTILITIES (TU)
In this section we introduce the scenario considered in the paper. That is, we present a coalitional TU game in which the player have to allocate rewards by themselves (i.e. without a central coordinator) by exchanging only local information. In order to describe the scenario, we first recall the main notions of a coalitional TU game.
Consider a set N = {1, . . . , n} of players and a function η : S → R defined for each nonempty coalition S ⊆ N . We write < N, η > to denote the transferable utility (TU) game with the players' set N and the characteristic function η. We let η S be the value η(S) of the characteristic function η associated with a nonempty coalition S ⊆ N . Given a TU game < N, η >, let C(η) be the core of the game,
Essentially, the core of the game is the set of all allocations that make the grand coalition stable with respect to all subcoalitions. Condition
nonempty S ⊂ N goes under the name of stability with respect to subcoalitions as it guarantees that the total amount given to the members of a coalition exceeds the value of the coalition itself.
Next, we introduce a network (peer-to-peer) version of repeated coalitional TU games. Informally the agents have to decide how to allocate rewards through a bargaining protocol in which each player can communicate only with neighboring players.
Formally, at evert time t, each agent allocates a reward vector x i (t) ∈ R n , where the jth component [x i ] j (t) represents the amount that player i assigns to player j. We assume that each player may observe the allocations of a subset of the other players at any time, which are termed as the neighbors of the player. The players and their neighbors at time t can be represented by a directed graph G(t) = (N, E(t)). A link (j, i) ∈ E(t) exists if player j is a neighbor of player i at time t. We refer to graph G(t) as a neighbor-graph at time t. In the graph G(t), a player j is a neighbor of player i (i.e., (j, i) ∈ E(t)) only if player i can observe the allocation vector of player j at time t.
We assume that each player has an estimatex i (t) ∈ R n of the time-averaged allocations vector. The objective is to generate the new local reward vector x i (t + 1) such thatx i (t) approaches the core of the game in the limit. Furthermore, we ask all the agents' estimatesx i (t) to agree on a common vector which is the true time-averaged reward vector.
DISTRIBUTED REWARD ALLOCATION ALGORITHM
In this section we present the distributed algorithm that generates the allocation vector x i (t), so that the local time-averaged estimatesx i (t) asymptotically: (i) reach consensus on the common true time-averaged vector and (ii) approach the core of the game.
The time-averaged estimatex i (t) evolves according to the discrete-time dynamicŝ
where
is a vector of nonnegative weights. The interpretation of the above equation is that at the generic iteration t, each single agent updates its average estimate in two steps. First it computes a weighted average of its own average estimate and those of his neighbors, let us call it space average. Second, it generates a new reward vector x i (t + 1). Thus equation (1) represents a doubly averaging process in time and space. It is worth noting that the local reward vector x i (t + 1) plays the role of an input in equation (1). The idea is that player i has to generate the local reward vector x i (t) so that the estimate evolution in equation (1) reaches the two declared objectives (consensus on the common true time-averaged vector and convergence to the core of the game).
Following Tsitsiklis (1984) and Nedić et al. (2010) (see also Nedić and Bauso (2011) ) we can make the following assumptions on the information structure. We let A(t) be the weight matrix with entries a i j (t). In view of the construction of matrices A(t), we see that a i j (t) ≥ α for j = i and perhaps for some players j that are neighbors of player i.
The meaning of Assumption 1 is that every single agent weights significantly the local information, i.e., the information received from its neighbors. Thus we guarantee mutual persistent excitation in time of agents estimates and therefore no information is loss. Also, Assumption 1 says that each agent takes a convex combination of its estimate and the estimates of its neighbors and guarantees that all agents are equally influential in the long run.
It is natural to expect that the connectivity of the players' neighbor-graphs G(t) = (V, E(t)) impacts the estimate process. At any time, the instantaneous graph G(t) need not be connected. However, for the proper behavior of the process, the union of the graphs G(t) over a period of time is assumed to be connected. Assumption 2. There is an integer Q ≥ 1 such that the graph N,
We can rewrite equation (1) in a more compact way aŝ
where w i (t) is the space average defined as
Let X ⊂ R n be the core set of the game. A common assumption in approachability theory is that both the core set is convex and bounded and the loss or payoff vectors generated at each time are bounded. Thus following Blackwell (1956) ; Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi (2006), we borrow and adapt such an assumption to our framework. Assumption 3. The core set X is nonempty.
Notice that a nonempty core is a convex and compact set.
The next assumption indicates how the new reward vector has to be generated in order to obtain approachability. Assumption 4. (Approachability) Blackwell (1956) For each t ≥ 0 the new reward vector x i (t + 1) is bounded, i.e., there exists L > 0 s.t. x i (t + 1) ≤ L ∀t ≥ 0, and satisfies the following inequality, for a scalar negative number, φ < 0, (w i (t) − P X (w i (t))) (x i (t + 1) − P X (w i (t)) ≤ φ < 0.
From a geometric standpoint, Assumption 4 requires that, given the two halfspaces identified by the supporting hyperplane of X through P X (w i (t)), the new reward vector x i (t + 1) lies in the half-space not containing w i (t).
Our goal is to prove that under the above assumptions, all estimates converge to a unique value and this value belongs to X. More formally, for all i, j ∈ V we wisĥ
w i (t)
x i (t + 1) Fig. 1 . Approachability principle.
The above condition guarantees at the same time that i) the agents reach consensus on estimates, and ii) the estimates approach the set X.
DISTRIBUTED ALGORITHM ANALYSIS: APPROACHABILITY AND CONSENSUS
Next, we provide the main results of the paper. Namely, we prove that: (i) the estimates approach the set X (Theorem 1), and (ii) the estimates reach consensus on the time-average of the common reward vector (Theorem 2).
Before stating the first theorem, we need to introduce two lemmas. The next lemma establishes that the space averaging step in (1) reduces the total distance (i.e. the sum of distances) of the estimates from the set X. Lemma 1. Let Assumption 1 hold. Then the total distance from X decreases when replacing the estimatesx i (t) by their space averages w i (t), i.e.,
Proof. By convexity of the distance function dist(·, ·) and from (3) we have
Summing over i = 1, . . . , n both sides of the above inequality we obtain
This concludes our proof.
The following lemma states that, under the approachability assumption, the distance of each single estimate from X decreases with respect to the one of the spatial average when applying the time averaging step. Lemma 2. Let Assumption 3-4 hold. Then, there exists a positive integer scalar,t > 0, such that for all t ≥t > 0 the distance of each singlex i (t + 1) decreases in comparison with the distance of w i (t), i.e., dist(
Proof. From the definition of dist(·, X) and from (1) and (3) we can write dist(
(5) Rearranging the above equations we obtain
Note that the left hand side in (6) approximates dist(x i (t+ 1), X) 2 − dist(w i (t), X) 2 for increasing t and also that for all t the left hand side upper bounds such a difference, i.e., dist(
It remains to note that there exists a great enough scalar integert such that the left hand side in (6) is negative for all t ≥t.
From the boundedness of set X and of vectors x i (t), there exists M > 0 such that
We are now ready to state the first main result. Theorem 1. (Approachability). Let Assumptions 1-4 hold. Then all estimates approach set X, i.e.,
Proof.
Recalling from (5) that
From Lemma 1 and rearranging the above inequality, we have
Summing over t = 0, . . . , τ − 1, and noticing that x i (t + 1) − P X [w i (t)] is bounded (from Assumption 3), so that the right hand side is upper bounded by some M > 0, we obtain
2 = 0, which concludes the proof.
Next, let us introduce the barycenter of the estimateŝ
and of the reward vectors
Consistently, let us denote asx b (t) the time average of the barycenter, i.e.x b (t) = t τ =0 x b (τ ). The following lemma establishes that the barycenter of the estimates evolves as the time averagex b (t) of the barycenter of the reward vectors generated by the agents. Lemma 3. The barycenter of the local estimatesx b (t) coincides at each time t with the time-average of the barycenter of the generated reward vectorsx b (t).
Proof. To prove the statement observe thatx b (0) = x b (0) = x b (0). Thus, we prove thatx b (t) andx b (t) satisfy the same dynamics. By definition of time-average,x b (t) satisfies the dynamics
The dynamics ofx b (t) is
Exchanging the sum signŝ
and, by Assumption 1 (A(t) is doubly stochastic),
which is the same dynamics as (8), thus concluding the proof.
The following theorem establishes that all estimates converge tox b (t), which in the limit must belong to X according to Theorem 1. Theorem 2. (Consensus to the barycenter time-average) Let Assumptions 1-4 hold. Then, all agents reach consensus on the time-average of the barycenter of the reward vectors generated by each player,x b (t), i.e., lim
Proof. Using the previous lemma we can show thatx i (t) converges tox b (t). Let us introduce the error of the estimatex i (t) from the barycenter, i.e.ê i (t) =x i (t)−x b (t). The error dynamics is given bŷ Definingẑ i (t) = tê i (t), we havê z i (t + 1) = n j=1 a i j (t)ẑ j (t) + e i (t + 1).
The unforced dynamics of this system is asymptotically stable. Thus, from the boundedness of e i (t + 1) (by Assumption 3) we have thatẑ i (t) is bounded. Thus, for t going to infinityê i (t) converges to zero, thus concluding the proof.
Summarizing the two main results, we have proven that asymptotically all the agents converge to the time-average of the barycenter of the generated reward vectors and that this vector lies in the core of the game.
CONCLUSIONS
For a coalitional TU game over a network, we have studied convergence properties of a distributed bargaining algorithm. Convergence of the algorithm guarantees stability of the grand coalition.
We highlight here three main future directions. First, we will analyze a robust version of the algorithm in presence of a worst-case bounded disturbance acting on the new reward vector. Second, we will investigate the case with large finite players as well as the asymptotic scenario with infinite homogeneous players in line with the mean field games theory Bauso et al. (2012b); Huang et al. (2007) ; Lasry and Lions (2007) . A third line of research extends the results obtained here to a different algorithm which accounts for the cumulative estimate (rather than the average) in the spirit of the attainability theory recently proposed in Lehrer et al. (2011) .
